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REGULATIONS ON BID RIGGING IN JAPAN,
THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
Naoaki Okatanit
Abstract. This article provides a comparative perspective on bid rigging in Japan,
the United States and Europe. It emphasizes the differences in both institutional structure
as well as policy and business culture in the three jurisdictions, particularly in terms of
antitrust and criminal law enforcement. It notes the greater tolerance of bid rigging in
Japan in the case of construction contracts for public works.
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. BID RIGGING IN JAPAN
A. Regulations on Bid Rigging under the Antimonopoly Law
1. Regulatory Measures by the FTC
2. Damage Remedy Suits
B. Illegal Bid Rigging Under the Penal Code
C. Other Issues
1. Major Construction Bid Rigging Cases in Japan
III. BID RIGGING IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
A. The United States
B. Europe
IV. REVIEW OF JAPAN'S CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
V. CONCLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION
In Japan, the procedures used for government procurement and work
contracts are set forth in article 29-3, article 29-5, and article 29-6 of the
Accounts Law. 1 This law requires the determination of the contracting
parties at the conclusion of the bidding process. (In the case of local public
t. Senior Research Associate, Corporate Communications Research Bureau, Market Development
Department, Mitsubishi Research Institute.
I Kaikei h6 (Accounts Law), arts. 29-3, 29-5, 29-6, Law No. 35 of 1947 [hereinafter Accounts
Law].
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authorities, article 234 of the Local Autonomy Law2 contains a similar
provision.) Bid rigging is a practice conducted among bidders during the
bidding process for public works contracts and other projects offered by the
government and municipal offices. Bidders collude and decide which
companies should get public works orders and the expected contract price.
Each bidder then bids in such a manner that the pre-determined contract
winner and contract price become, respectively, the successful bidder and
the successful bid price. There are two methods of bid rigging. In the first
method, a winning bid is determined for each contract. In the second
method, construction firms take turns to become successful bidders accord-
ing to certain rules.
Today in Japan, corruption cases involving bid rigging by construc-
tion firms are known as the "general contractors scandal," and are drawing
widespread attention as they spotlight graft and adhesion among politicians,
business and bureaucrats. On March 6, 1993, Tokyo prosecutors arrested
Shin Kanemaru 3 former vice president of the Liberal Democratic Party, on
charges of tax evasion. As a result of this arrest, the prosecutors discovered
that several general contractors had doled out under-the-table political
donations to Kanemaru. The special investigation squad of the Tokyo
District Public Prosecutor's Office moved in earnest to probe into the
"general contractors scandal." Since June 1993, Tokyo prosecutors have
arrested a bevy of high-ranking incumbent local government officials on
charges of accepting bribes, including Torn Ishii, mayor of Sendai, Fujio
Takeuchi, governor of Ibaraki Prefecture, and Shuntaro Honma, governor of
Miyagi Prefecture. At the same time, they arrested the chairmen and vice
presidents of several large Japanese construction firms on bribery charges.
The companies involved included Shimizu Corp., Kajima Corp., Taisei
Corp., and Hazama. In addition, on March 11, 1994, the special investiga-
tion section of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor's Office arrested former
2 Chih6 jichi h6 (Local Autonomy Law), art. 234, Law No. 67 of 1947 [hereinafter Local
Autonomy Law].
3 Shin Kanemaru had been one of the most influential figures in Japanese politics as leader of
Keiseikai, the largest faction in the Liberal Democratic Party, until he was arrested on charges of massive
tax evasion, which led to revelations of back-door donations. At the same time, Kanemaru reigned as the
don of the kensetsu zoku gi'in (literally, 'construction Diet men'), a group of special-interest politicians
closely linked to the construction industry, and received huge under-the-table donations from construction
firms. In the construction industry of Yamanashi Prefecture, Kanemaru's constituency, there was intense
political strife in the gubernatorial election. As a rule, the construction interests that supported the winning
candidate monopolized public works contracts given by the newly elected governor. The bid-winning
construction companies gave unlawful contributions to the newly elected governor on the basis of the suc-
cessful bid price.
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Construction Minister Kishiro Nakamura4 on charges of "intermediary brib-
ery," as provided for in article 197-4 of the Penal Code.5 This was the first
time in twenty-six years, since the 1968 arrest of Upper House member
Seiichi Okura (Social Democratic Party), that an incumbent Diet member
had been arrested for intermediary bribery.
Bid rigging in the construction industry is the root cause of corruption
among politicians and public servants. It produces adverse effects by
forcing taxpayers to bear the burden of high construction costs. Moreover,
bid rigging runs counter to the competition rules, which are internationally
common these days. This article aims to elucidate the root cause and back-
ground of the illegal practice of bid rigging and find ways to remedy this
situation in order to prevent bid rigging. Specifically, it addresses five
major points: 1) regulations on bid rigging in Japan; 2) major construction
bid rigging cases in Japan; 3) regulations on bid rigging and major cases in
Europe and the United States; 4) problems with Japan's construction
industry and the bidding contract system for public works projects; and 5)
measures to prevent bid rigging in the construction industry. In particular,
this article focuses on the question of how to toughen legal sanctions and
improve bidding contract systems for public works projects.
4 Kishiro Nakamura, like Kanemaru, was an influential politician belonging to the Keiseikai Party
and one of the "bosses" in the "construction tribe." He was also deputy chairman of the Special
Investigation Committee on the Antimonopoly Law. Nakamura received a bribe of ¥1O million from
Shinji Kiyoyama, then vice president of Kajima Corp., and, in response to Kiyoyama's request, pressured
the FTC Chairman, Umezawa, to not bring criminal charges against the "Saitama Saturday Society."
5 Article 197-4 of Japan's Penal Code defines the crime of intermediary bribery as follows:
A public officer who, in response to an entreaty, causes another public officer to commit im-
proper acts, acts as an intermediary for the facilitation of such wrongdoing, or receives, demands
or contracts to receive a bribe in exchange for committing such acts shall be sentenced to a penal
servitude of not longer than five years.
KEIHO art 197-4.
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II. REGULATIONS ON BID RIGGING IN JAPAN
A. Regulations on Bid Rigging under the Antimonopoly Law
In article 2.6 of the Antimonopoly Law,6 bid rigging is defined as
"the restriction of business activities through mutual cooperation between
companies and the substantial restraint of competition in certain business
areas against public interests (cartel)." Bid rigging is controlled in accor-
dance with regulations that prohibit the unfair restriction of business, as
prescribed in the latter part of article 3 of the Antimonopoly Law. 7 When
trade associations are involved, bid rigging is controlled in accordance with
regulations that prohibit a substantial restraint of competition by trade
associations, as stipulated in article 8.1.1.8
The question then is what specific behavior among companies is
deemed a case of "mutual restriction." Naturally, if there is an explicit
agreement among companies on the price and contract winner, then such
behavior is illegal. Moreover, even a gentleman's agreement is considered
an explicit agreement, regardless of whether any effective measures are
secured to impose sanctions on parties that violate the agreement.
Furthermore, if, as a result of the exchange of information between compa-
nies, they reach a tacit understanding on the price and contract winner, this
would constitute a violation of the law even when an explicit decision is not
made at that point.
In particular, trade associations frequently become a hotbed of bid
rigging. For this reason, the Fair Trade Commission ("FTC") has
announced two sets of guidelines to control the activities of trade associa-
tions. In 1979, the FTC released the "Guidelines under the Antimonopoly
Law for Activities of Trade Associations." The FTC presented regulatory
guidelines to prevent trade associations from acting as coordinators of bid
rigging and other behavior that hinders competition.
Furthermore, in 1984, the FTC issued "Guidelines under the
Antimonopoly Law for Various Activities of Trade Associations in the
Construction Industry Involved in Public Works Projects" (Construction
Industry Guidelines) for the construction industry. The construction indus-
6 Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi k6sei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru h6ritsu (Law Concerning the
Prohibition of Private Monopoly and the Maintenance of Fair Trade) art. 2.6, Law No. 54 of 1947
[hereinafter Antimonopoly Law].
7 Idart. 3.
8 Id art. 8.1.
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try, which takes part in public works projects, is an industry that subcon-
tracts work on a single contract basis, mostly to medium and small-scale
companies. Because competition is intense, some of these companies enter
into contracts without taking profitability into account. Given these special
characteristics of the construction industry, the likelihood of companies
engaging in bid rigging is high. Moreover, in most cases, trade associations
make arrangements for bid rigging. Thus, the FTC drew up the
Construction Industry Guidelines and presented examples of legitimate
behavior by trade associations in order to deter wrongdoing. The examples
cited allow public works trade associations to provide information and
managerial guidance in compliance with the Antimonopoly Law unless the
expected contract winner or the bid price is determined in violation of rules
ensuring competitive bidding. In other words, a general exchange of
information is deemed legitimate, while the exchange of information on
individual bids is illegal even if no agreement was reached on a successful
bidder. The Construction Industry Guidelines were abolished as a result of
the July 1994 formulation of "Guidelines under the Antimonopoly Law for
Activities of Contractors and Trade Associations Involved in Public Bids"
(Guidelines on Public Works Projects).
1. Regulatory Measures by the FTC
The FTC controls bid rigging by taking the following actions. First,
it orders the elimination of the violating measures.9 In particular, it requires
offenders to annul the bidding agreement made by companies and to dis-
close rigged bids in newspapers and other media. In addition, the FTC
issues a cease and desist order to prevent repeat offenses and requires
wrongdoers to report certain items to the FTC.
Second, surcharges are imposed.10 To eliminate unfair profits, the
FTC levies surcharges equal to the product of the successful bid price
stemming from bid rigging at a certain rate computed according to the law.
The rate is six percent of the successful bid price for large companies and
three percent for medium and small-scale companies.
9 Idarts. 7, 9.2.
10 Id arts. 7.2, 8.3.
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Finally, the FTC can pursue criminal charges for illegal activities
violating the Antimonopoly Law. On June 20, 1990, the FTC announced
accusation standards titled "Guidelines of the Fair Trade Commission
Concerning Accusations of Violations of the Antimonopoly Law," suggest-
ing its intent to make criminal accusations. Subsequently, in November
1991, personnel in charge of marketing at eight makers of wrapping
material for industrial use were accused on charges of forming price cartels.
Up to that point, the FTC had filed a criminal indictment in only one case
- the oil cartel of 1974. It can be said that the FTC is beginning
aggressively to make criminal charges in line with its accusation standards.
As for criminal penalties, the offender is subject to either a maximum
fine of Y5 million or sentenced to a maximum three-year prison term. 11
Egregious offenders, on the other hand, are subject to both fines and prison
terms. 12 Moreover, the double-penalty provision 13 calls for imposing a
maximum fine of ¥100 million on corporations. 14 Trade associations are
treated in the same manner as corporations. Furthermore, articles 95.2 and
95.3 stipulate that representatives of corporations and trade associations
who, notwithstanding their knowledge of the offenses, fail to prevent and
correct the situation are also subject to fines. 15
2. Damage Remedy Suits
In addition, the purchaser under the contract (the government) can file
a damage remedy suit against companies that engage in bid rigging, pursu-
ant to article 25 of the Antimonopoly Law and article 709 of the Civil
Code.16 In May 1991, the FTC published the "Outline of the Provision of
Materials Concerning Damage Remedy Suits against Violations of the
Antimonopoly Law." In order to alleviate the plaintiffs' (injured parties')
burden of proof, the FTC clarified the standards for submitting materials to
the court necessary to prove the existence of violations and damages. As
11 Id art. 89.
12 Id art. 92.
13 Id art. 95.
14 The maximum penalty on companies and trade associations was raised from -5 million to ,100
million (effective as of January 1, 1993). Japanese companies, construction companies in particular,
strongly objected to the raising of the penalty on corporations to V¥100 million, separately from the penal-
ties on individual offenders.
15 Antimonopoly Law, supra note 6, arts. 95.2, 95.3.
16 MINPO art. 709.
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will be discussed later, in the lawsuit filed by residents against the "Saitama
Saturday Society," the FTC submitted, upon the request of the Urawa
District Court, investigation materials which constituted the basis of the
decision on violations of the Antimonopoly Law.
A recent example of a large damage remedy suit is the 1988 bid rig-
ging case concerning the U.S. naval base in Yokosuka. The U.S. naval base
headquarters in Japan placed orders for the construction of facilities. The
Study Group of U.S. Military Construction Safety Technology, a trade asso-
ciation, consisting of sixty-nine member firms and Kajima Corp., allegedly
took part in bid rigging on this construction. To wipe out the wrongdoing,
the FTC ordered these seventy firms to pay surcharges totaling ¥290
million, and issued a written warning to the 140 construction companiesthat
engaged in bid rigging. Although Kajima Corp. was not a member of the
Study Group, it decided the expected contract winner in tandem with mem-
bers of the Study Group and adjusted bid prices so that the expected
contract winner would be awarded the project. After the FTC took adminis-
trative actions, the U.S. Government filed a claim for damages totaling $37
million, or roughly Y5 billion, against the 140 construction companies that
were involved in bid rigging. The case was settled when the companies
agreed to pay nearly Y5 billion in damages.
Moreover, in bringing damage remedy suits, the fee (stamp fee) that
must be paid to the court was previously 0.5 percent of the amount sought
by the suit for amounts exceeding Y3 million. As such, it was difficult to
make a claim for a vast sum of damages. Following the Japan-U.S.
Structural Impediments Initiative ("SII") talks, article 3.1 of the Law
Concerning Costs of Civil Lawsuits17 was amended, and the fee to be paid
to the court was reduced.
B. Illegal Bid Rigging under the Penal Code
Paragraph 2 of Penal Code 96-3 sets forth regulations concerning
illegal bid rigging.' 8 It states that there are criminal penalties for participa-
tion in a collusion at specific individual biddings aimed at "undermining the
17 Minji sosh6 hiy6 nado ni kansuru h~ritsu (Law Concerning Costs of Civil Lawsuits), ait. 3.1,'Law
No. 40 of 1971.
18 KEIHI arL 96-3.
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fair price or making illegal profits." 19 This provision was added to the
Penal Code in 1941. Participants in illegal bid rigging are sentenced to a
maximum two-year prison term or fined a maximum Y2.5 million. On
November 2, 1992, the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor's Office brought
charges of illegal collusion against marketing managers and other personnel
of four companies involved in the bid rigging of seals used on various
payment slips ordered by the Social Insurance Agency. 20
According to Supreme Court precedent, a "fair price" does not refer
to a fair price that should be measured objectively, separately from the con-
cept of bidding, but generally means the successful bid price resulting from
fair and free competition in the concerned bid.21 For this reason, precedents
of the Supreme Court suggest that a "fair price" is unrelated to the success-
ful bidder's profit, and thus real costs and fair profits do not need to be
taken into account in defining "fair price."22 However, according to the
lower court rulings, as in the Tokyo High Court ruling of July 20, 1953, a
"fair price" is a price that includes ordinary profit in the minimum real
construction cost.23 There are precedents where bid rigging aimed at
19 Id.
20 Judgment of Dec. 14, 1993, K6sai [High Court], SHOJI HANREI, No. 937, Mar. 15, 1994, at 27
(holding all defendants guilty of violating the Antimonopoly Law in a bid-rigging case involving use of
seals on various payment slips ordered by the Social Insurance Agency). The FTC lodged charges of ille-
gal collusion as provided in the Penal Code and violation of articles 73-1 and 96 of the Antimonopoly Law.
21 Judgment of May 28, 1944, Daishin6in [Great Court of Judicature], 23 Daihan Keishii 97 (holding
that a "fair price" does not refer to a fair price that should be measured objectively, apart from the concept
of bidding, but rather the successful bid price resulting from fair and free competition in the bidding con-
cemed).
22 Judgment of July 19, 1957, Saik6sai [Supreme Court], II Keishii 1966. "Fair price," as
mentioned previously in Penal Code art. 96-3, refers to a successful bid price formed by fair and free com-
petition in the concerned bidding rather than a fair price to be measured objectively, separately from the
notion of bidding, or "a price that includes reasonable profit plus the real cost and, at which the party with
the most favorable terms wins the contract bid through fair and free competition." That is, the Supreme
Court ruled that collusion aimed at avoiding "bidding at a loss" is also illegal.
23 Judgment of July 20, 1953, Tokyo K~sai [High Court]. The Tokyo High Court ruled that "an un-
fair profit" occurs when that profit undermines the fair price to be determined at a bidding, that is, a price
at which a bidder with the most advantageous condition ought to have successfully bid with the sum of the
net cost and a proper profit. That is, the Tokyo High Court's interpretation is that collusion aimed at
avoiding bidding at a loss is not illegal. See also Judgment of Oct. 30, 1954, Osaka K6sai [High Court];
Judgment of May 24, 1957, Tokyo K6sai [High Court], 10 K6keishii 361. Both the Osaka High Court
ruling and the Tokyo High Court ruling share the same interpretation. In particular, in its May 24, 1957
ruling, the Tokyo High Court held that:
If the sole intent of the competitive bidding system is to discover the person that offers the most
favorable terms for calculation purposes to the implementing side ... barriers to free market
principles may be seriously hampered and the results of competitive bidding will lead to com-
petition among companies where bidders will not stop at any means. Depending on the
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avoiding winning contracts at a price less than the cost was not deemed a
crime. Today, the court generally adheres to this interpretation, which does
not view all bid rigging as illegal.24
"Unfair profits" are found when a promise is made to distribute to
bidders, payoffs in excess of what is considered a sign of courtesy generally
accepted by society.25
C. Other Issues
The Construction Law authorizes the Minister of Construction and
prefectural governors to impose a business suspension for not longer than
one year on companies that resort to such viciously illegal acts as bribery
and intimidation. However, the "Survey Concerning Procedures for
Participation in Competitive Contracts," released by the Management and
economic situation and other conditions, this will cause bidding'to be carried out at so-called
'dumping prices' that ignore companies' economic profits, imperiling the very existence of the
companies themselves and giving rise to a situation that may constitute a serious threat to the
lives of those who depend on such companies.., inflicting unexpected losses on the bid imple-
menting party, and, in many cases, may economically harm the state and public ....
Judgment of May 24, 1957, Tokyo Kasai, [High Court], 10 K6keishii 361. The Tokyo High Court deemed
it appropriate, therefore, to exempt collusion aimed at avoiding bidding at a loss from the provisions of
Penal Code art. 96-3. Thus, the High Court ruling was squarely opposite to that of the Supreme Court,
mentioned in Note 22.
24 Judgment of Aug. 27, 1968, Otsu Chisai [District Court], 10 Kakeishi 866 (holding that, in the
case of bidding that ignores profits, an agreement made with the intent to raise the successful bid price to
reach the amount that includes ordinary profits, does not constitute collusion aimed at undermining a fair
price).
25 In Annotated Penal Code, compiled by Shigemitsu Dando, "an aim to acquire unfair profits"
refers to:
(1) a case where collusion is carried out without any intent to implement construction work but
for the sole purpose of obtaining payoffs to bidders, and
(2) a case where economic gains are in excess of what is considered a sign of commonly ac-
cepted courtesy and are unreasonably high even when a company which has the intention to
implement construction work, abandons such an intention and agrees to engage in collusion with
other companies in exchange for receiving money and other economic gains.
SHIGEMITSU DANDO, CHOSHAKU KEIHO [ANNOTATED PENAL.CODE] (1964). See also Judgment of Jan. 22,
1957, Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 1 Keishii 50. On July 19, 1957, the Supreme Court ruled that "unfair
profits as described later in Section 2 of Penal Code 96-3 refer to the case where gains from collusion are
in excess of what is considered a sign of courtesy generally accepted by society." Judgment of July 19,
1957, Saik6sai [Supreme Court], II Keishai 1966.
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Coordination Agency in December 1993, pointed out that administrative
measures taken against companies that engaged in wrongdoing were lenient.
For instance, the heaviest of the administrative actions taken under the
terms of the Construction Law26 against twenty-five defendants found
guilty of such offenses as bribery, bidding interference and intimidation was
suspension of business operations for only fifteen days. In addition, chief
executive officers of a company warned by the FTC are held ineligible for
decoration for five years.
Recently, companies which engage in bid rigging face the possibility
of being sued by stockholders and residents. As a result of the amendment
of the Commercial Law27 in 1993, paragraph 4 was added to article 267.
Stockholders can now bring an action as "a claim that is not for property
rights" with a stamp fee of only Y8,200. In October 1993, stockholders filed
a lawsuit to claim damages totaling Y99 million against Shigeru Honda,
former chairman of Hazama-Gumi, and four managing directors. Moreover,
paragraph 1.4 of section 242-2 of the Local Government Law28 stipulates
that when leaders and employees of local public authorities are found to
have paid illegal or unfair public money, residents can make a claim for
damages in place of the local public authorities. In the "Saitama Saturday
Society" case, sixty-one residents brought action against former Governor
Hata of Saitama Prefecture, former prefectural leaders, and sixty-three
general contractors who were members of the Saturday Society, and
claimed for damages against Saitama Prefecture for awarding the contract at
a high price.
1. Major Construction Bid Rigging Cases in Japan
The following five cases can be cited as major bid rigging cases in the
construction industry over the past years. The first instance is the 1981 bid
rigging case of the Shizuoka General Constructors Association, Shimizu
General Constructors Association, and Numazu Seifukai.29 In this incident,
26 Kensetsu-gy6 h6 (Construction Law), Law No. 100 of 1949 [hereinafter Construction Law].
27 SHOH6 art. 267.
28 Local Autonomy Law, supra note 2, art. 242-2.
29 With regard to construction work for which orders were placed through bidding within the geo-
graphical area of each association, a contract winner was decided on the basis of the rules established by
the Shizuoka General Constructors Association, Shimizu General Constructors Association, and Numazu
Seifukai for determining the contract winner. For instance, the Shizuoka General Constructors
Association, in principle, decided the expected contract winner of the concerned construction project
through talks held on the day before the bid date in order to prevent a decline in the contract price and
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Shizuoka City, Shimizu City, Numazu City and the local federation of con-
struction contractors acted as coordinators for bid rigging on public works
contracts. The FTC ordered a total of 111 firms - 44 in Shizuoka, 42 in
Shimizu, and 25 in Numazu - to take measures to eliminate violations and
pay surcharges totaling ¥290 million. Because the FTC conducted an
inspection, social interest in bid rigging in the construction industry was
substantially heightened.
The second instance is the 1988 bid rigging case of the Yokosuka
U.S. naval base. This case drew widespread attention because it developed
into an international scandal. The FTC took administrative action, while the
U.S. Government made a claim for damages.
The third instance is the case of the Maritime Earth Filling Sediment
Association ("MEFSA") of 1989. This case involved bid rigging on moun-
tain sand maritime transport work and the pouring of mountain sand into the
ocean to create a levee around the peripheral area of the new Kansai
International Airport island during construction. MEFSA, a trade associa-
tion, decided the volume and unit price of orders by companies from which
the members received orders, and made the members bid accordingly. The
FTC ordered six MEFSA member firms to take measures to eliminate
illegal activities and pay surcharges totaling ¥Y300 million. In addition,
MEFSA was broken up in 1989 to prevent future wrongdoing.
The fourth instance is the "Saitama Saturday Society" case of 1992.30
In this case, sixty-six member firms of the "Saitama Saturday Society"
engaged in bid rigging on public works projects ordered by prefectures or
municipalities in Saitama Prefecture. This case attracted attention primarily
because there had been speculation that the FTC would bring criminal
charges as in the case of the industrial-use wrapping material cartel.
Although the FTC considered criminal charges, no indictments were
make the opportunities for contract awarding equal. When an agreement failed to be reached through talks,
the Association determined "rules concerning rationalization," which basically called for the expected con-
tract winner to be decided by the arbitration committee appointed by the association.
Prompted by the disclosure of these three cases, the government in 1984, formulated Guidelines
under the Antimonopoly Act for Various Activities of Trade Associations in the Construction Industry
Involved in Public Works Projects.
30 This case led to the crime of intermediary bribery committed by Diet member Kishiro Nakamura.
Although the FTC wanted to bring criminal charges against him, it faced difficulty in proving that all of the
sales managers of 66 firms had participated in a cartel. Thus, after consulting with the prosecutors, the
FTC dropped the idea of pressing criminal charges.
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forthcoming. The FTC ordered the sixty-six firms to eliminate the violating
practices and pay surcharges totaling Y1 billion.
The fifth instance is the 1993 case of the Sasebo Naval Base. At the
time, the U.S. Department of Justice was planning to file a damage remedy
suit in accordance with article 709 of Japan's Civil Code3' before the FTC
took administrative action. This case differs from the case of the Yokosuka
U.S. naval base in that the U.S. Department of Justice actually took legal
steps prior to the FTC's administrative actions. In the end, an amicable
settlement was reached when the U.S. Department of Justice received a total
of $1,055,000 (roughly Y1 13 million) from twenty-seven Japanese
companies.
From these cases, it can be concluded that one of the salient features
of bid rigging in the Japanese construction industry is the involvement of
trade associations in determining the expected contract winner and the
successful bid price.
IV. BID RIGGING IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
A. The United States
Europe and the United States also impose strict controls on bid
rigging. In the United States, bid rigging is accomplished through the use
of cartels, which are per se illegal. The Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice pursues criminal charges in accordance with section 1
of the Sherman Act. Individual violators are fined a maximum amount
equal to the largest of either $350,000, twice the profits acquired from
illegal activities, or twice the damage incurred as a result of illegal
activities, and/or sentenced to a maximum three-year imprisonment. On the
other hand, corporations are fined a maximum amount equal to the largest
of either $10 million, twice the profits acquired from illegal activities, or
twice the damage incurred as a result of illegal activities. Furthermore, the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice can file a suit under equity
in accordance with section 4 of the Sherman Act and can request the
elimination of violations in the future. In addition, the Department of
Justice can bring damage remedy suits as provided in section 4A of the
Clayton Act and make a claim for treble damages and compensation for
lawsuit costs. The Federal Trade Commission also can take administrative
31 MIlNP6 art. 709.
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measures in accordance with section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. In reality, the antitrust division of the Department of Justice decides
whether to bring criminal indictments in most cases.
Based on precedent, bid rigging in the United States can be classified
into the following types:
(a) Refusing to participate in bidding or agreeing to set an
unreasonably high bid price;32
(b) Agreeing to compare bid prices before submitting them
to the owner;33
(c) Agreeing to submit only moderate individual bids so that
the project will be awarded to a joint venture, in which
the work and profits can be shared; 34 and
(d) Engaging in bidding on a rotational basis by obtaining
the consent of specific competitors to not participate in
bidding in exchange for a promise to make them the suc-
cessful bidder in a future bid.35
32 See, e.g., United States v. Champion Int'l Corp., 557 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977). Seven companies, including Champion International, engaged in bid rigging
so that they could purchase timber sold by the United States Forest Service at the lowest price the Forest
Service could accept. Seven of the defendant firms were found guilty.
33 See, e.g., United States v. W.F. Brinkley & Son Constr. Co., 783 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1986). This
was a bid rigging case related to a pipeline construction project undertaken by Elizabeth City (North
Carolina) for carrying water from the Pasquotank river. By comparing bid prices in advance, companies
with low bid prices found out that other firms were actually no longer competitors and therefore could raise
their bid price. This practice was regarded as bid-rigging in violation of the Antimonopoly Law. Id at
1158-60.
34 See COMPACT v. Metropolitan Gov't, 594 F. Supp. 1567, 1577-79 (M.D. Tenn. 1984).
COMPACT, a construction company in Tennessee, filed suit against the city for excluding it from subcon-
tracted work on the metropolitan airport facility. The federal district court ruled that the construction
company colluded with other companies to form a joint venture in order to acquire the work allocated to
the minority group and divide it among themselves. This, the court said, was illegal and interfered with
market division and public bidding.
The federal district court also held that joint arrangements are allowed only: 1) when a contract can-
not be concluded without a tie-up; 2) when a bidder is to manufacture a product it does not currently
manufacture; and 3) when a product cannot be manufactured competitively by only one participant. Id. at
1576.
35 See, e.g., United States v. Champion Int'l Corp., 557 F.2d 1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Although the methods used by contractors to coordinate orders are
very similar to Japan's bid rigging cases, in the United States politicians and
the governmental purchasing body intervene only in rare cases.
B. Europe
Europe has also imposed strict regulations on bid rigging. Bid rig-
ging is prohibited as a cartel activity under article 85.1 of the Rome Treaty.
Procedures of prohibition provisions are set forth in article 17 of the 1962
regulations of the board of chairmen. Meanwhile, the EC Commission can
issue an order for elimination measures against illegal activities in accor-
dance with article 85.1 of the Rome Treaty. In addition, it can impose on
companies which knowingly, or accidentally, violate article 85.1 of the
Rome Treaty a fine of ECU 1,000 or more, or an amount less than the
higher of either ECU 10 million or 10% of total sales for the previous fiscal
year.
In February 1992, the EC Commission levied a fine totaling ECU
22.50 million on twenty-eight groups (4,000 firms) and 300 finms for bid
rigging by the Construction Association of the Netherlands. 36
In Germany, all cartels are, in principle, prohibited by article 1.1 of
the Act Against Restraints of Competition. The Federal Cartel Office and
State Authorities levy fines on offenders, as provided in article 38.4 of the
Act Against Restraints of Competition. The maximum fine is the higher of
either DM1 million or three times net sales acquired from illegal activities.
Fines are levied on not only individuals and companies that carry out illegal
activities but also on officers who neglect their supervisory duties.
Furthermore, if bid rigging was carried out, the owner can make a claim for
damages against the party which engaged in bid rigging as defined in article
35 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition. Additionally, bid rigging
can be controlled as fraud under article 263 of the German Criminal Code.
However, there have not yet been any cases where this law was applied to
bid rigging.
In the construction bid rigging case of 1975, a fine totaling DM36
million was levied on 343 firms and 483 individuals. In the railroad and
36 SPO is an organization in the Netherlands, consisting of twenty-eight construction associations. A
total of more than 4,000 leading and medium-sized construction companies are members of the twenty-
eight associations.
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telephone bid rigging case of 1983, a fine amounting to roughly DM25
million was imposed on sixty-one firms and ninety individuals.
V. REVIEW OF JAPAN'S CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
Bid rigging is rampant in Japan because there are problems with the
structure of the construction industry and the system for placing orders for
public works projects. Today, the construction industry comprises a
menagerie of roughly 520,000 construction companies. Moreover, about
99% of them are medium and small companies with a capital of Y100
million or less. The industry employs a staggering 6.54 million workers, or
roughly 9% of Japan's work force. If construction companies were allowed
to freely compete for public works contracts, it is possible that competition
between small companies would escalate and thus force some of the
companies to go bankrupt and some workers to lose their jobs. For this
reason, construction companies generally believe that bid rigging is a
rational way to evenly allocate orders received. Further, in some quarters of
administrative agencies, it is viewed that the equalization of opportunities
for receiving orders and the protection of local companies calls for turning a
blind eye to bid rigging. Both views argue that there is no other choice but
to approve bid rigging in order to prevent small companies from being
weeded out of the market.
More recently, it has been pointed out that the bidding contract sys-
tem for public works projects is flawed and gives rise to illegal activities.
In particular, the system of designated competitive bidding is being criti-
cized. Under this system, the Ministry of Construction and local public
authorities rate construction companies according to their construction
capacity and other factors. They then designate three to twenty eligible
bidders according to type and scale of individual public works projects, and
enter into a contract with the company that presents the most favorable
terms during bidding. Yet, the criteria for designating companies are
unclear, and the process of decision lacks transparency. That is to say,
administrative agencies, which are the owners, designate companies to
engage in bidding largely on the basis of arbitrary decisions. Meanwhile,
because companies cannot participate in bidding unless they are designated,
they are in a very weak position in relation to administrative agencies.
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Thus, companies offer public servants from the Ministry of Construction
and local public authorities cushy jobs to cement ties with administrative
agencies. In order to be included in the list of designated bidders,
construction companies also make prodigious political donations to big-
name politicians such as Shin Kanemaru, who has vast influence over the
Ministry of Construction and heads of local public authorities who have
official powers to place orders for public works projects. Furthermore,
construction companies bribe and ask heads of local public authorities and
big-name politicians to act as coordinators of bid rigging to help them win
public works contracts.
A series of "general contractors corruption" was exposed with the
March 1993 arrest of Shin Kanemaru, former vice president of the Liberal
Democratic Party. Prompted by this, the designated competitive bidding
system has been drawing criticism as a system that facilitates bribes to
heads of local public authorities and prominent Diet members.
In addition, the "expected bid price system" is used by construction
companies as a criterion for agreeing on the successful bid price through bid
rigging. Under this system, the owner estimates in advance the construction
cost and treats this expected price as the upper limit on the bid price.
Therefore even if bid rigging is carried out, the successful bid price will
never exceed the expected price. But in bid rigging, the rigged price is very
close to the expected price, and consequently, the realization of a lower
price which would have resulted under fair and free competition is hindered.
In short, the construction industry has been coordinating orders
between companies through bid rigging because it is beset with problems
concerning its structure and the bidding contract system for public works
projects. The adverse result is that even small business owners, who lack
competitiveness in technology and management, are sustained at the
expense of taxpayers.37
VI. CONCLUSION
The following two measures are effective for preventing bid rigging
in the construction industry. First, illegal activities can be prevented if the
FTC and the Public Prosecutors Office work together closely and step up
regulations. These agencies should make it clear that all collusive activities
37 It is said that in municipalities which introduced general competitive bidding, the cost of public
works declined roughly 20%.
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are illegal. Specifically, it is essential to stiffen penalties against bid rigging
through such administrative means as elimination measures, surcharges, and
criminal accusations by the FTC, as well as criminal indictments by the
Public Prosecutors Office against bid rigging under the Antimonopoly Law
and Criminal Code. On March 4, 1994, the FTC published the draft of
"Guidelines under the Antimonopoly Act for Activities concerning Public
Bidding by Companies and Trade Associations" and indicated the regula-
tory standards under the Antimonopoly Law for procuring public works
contracts and materials bidding in the public sector. On the other hand, it is
necessary for the FTC to restrict bidding at prices below cost as unfair
underselling in order to forestall cut-throat bidding, not to mention bid rig-
ging. Local public authorities are taking measures to prevent bidding at
prices below cost by setting the minimum price at 80 to 85% of the
expected price.38 Nevertheless, it is said that there are cases where local
public authorities underestimate the expected price because they do not
fully take price changes into account. In this sense, it is questionable as to
how effective these measures are in preventing bidding below cost. Thus, it
would be effective to require the disclosure of the breakdown of the cost to
the successful bidder so that companies with objections can file a complaint
to the FTC about unfair underselling.
Second, the public works bidding contract system needs to be
improved. In December 1993, the Central Council on Construction
Contracting Business, an advisory body to the Minister of Construction,
recommended the reform of the bidding contract system in a report titled
"Reform of the Bidding Contract System for Public Works Projects." The
centerpiece of the report consists of four points concerning reform. First, it
calls for the adoption of a system that does not allow the owner to make
arbitrary decisions and for an increase in the objectivity of procedures by
enacting and disclosing various standards. Second, the Council suggests
stepping up monitoring, particularly by a third party, in order to enhance the
transparency of procedures. Third, the Council recommends the elimination
of bid rigging and other illegal activities by establishing conditions that
facilitate competition. Fourth, it calls for stiffening penalties to enforce fair
rules. In the future, it will be vital for the Ministry of Construction to
38 Local Autonomy Law, supra note 2, art. 234(3).
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accept the recommendations of the Council and enhance the objectivity and
transparency of bidding contract procedures for public works projects. In
particular, it will be increasingly important to switch from the designated
competitive bidding system, which is largely affected by the arbitrariness of
the owner, to an open-bidding system, and to allow a third party to conduct
qualification screening even if bidding eligibility is restricted.
